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Introduction
Competition policy and law appertain to market and/or market reform which 
has become an important ingredient of the democratic process* 1 in countries 
which are in transition from authoritarian systems to a liberal democracy. 
Furthermore, competition and/or competition law are not only concepts of 
law but have become important yardsticks of economic development.
It goes without saying that a meaningful implementation of the competition 
regime requires putting in place not only a proper and adequate competition 
law, but it also needs the establishment of an autonomous and capable com­
petition authority. The first part of this article deals with concepts and princi­
ples related to competition policies and laws, and in the second part a modest 
attempt has been made to appraise the Ethiopian situation in light of what has 
been addressed in the first part.
Part I- Competition Policy and Law
1. Competition Policy
It is maintained that an appropriate competition policy has to include both 
micro economic policies and Competition law.2 The phrase: “competition 
policy’ consists of two terms, i.e., competition and policy which must be first 
treated separately and then jointly for the sake of proper understanding of 
what is behind the phrase.
In the corporate world, competition is taken as a process whereby firms strive 
against each other to secure customers for their products.3 In market econo­
mies, competition refers to a situation where sellers strive for buyers’ patron­
age with a view to achieving certain business objectives like profits, sales or 
market share. This can be associated with rivalry in terms of price, quality, 
service or combination of these and other factors that are valued by custom-
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ers.4 On the other hand, policy refers to the general principles by which a 
government is guided in its management of public affairs.5
A businessperson or business firm competes to excel or to take the place of 
its rival, and under certain circumstances, the competitions may even involve 
attempts towards elimination. It is at this juncture that laws and policies in­
tervene to regulate the avenues and modalities of the competition so that the 
public at large and the business community can ultimately benefit from pre­
dictable and enforceable rules of conduct within the framework of free com­
petition.
Generally, business firms adopt two methods to out compete with others. 
One of these methods is fair and it is realized through means such as produc­
ing quality goods, becoming cost efficient, adopting the best technology, in­
vesting in research and development oriented activities. Under fair competi­
tion, firms do their best in terms of innovation, choice, quality and services to 
attract their customers.6 On the contrary, the practices referred to as ‘unfair 
methods'' involve the adoption of restrictive business practices such as preda­
tory pricing, exclusive dealing, forming cartels and the like7 rather than fo­
cusing on innovation, choice, quality and services.
Fair business practices can be associated with antimonopoly business behav­
iors and the unfair business practices with manifestations of monopolies, 
which are connected with scarcity of goods, poor quality, high prices, unre­
sponsiveness to consumers, unreasonable, irrational, or incomprehensible 
terms of dealing, an arbitrary and highhanded attitude.8 Usually, markets are 
far away from what is called perfect competition where a large number of 
firms produce homogeneous goods, fix one price, where the entry and exit 
are free and easy, where there is a perfect mobility of all players in the mar­
ket and where all the buyers and sellers have perfect information of the con­
ditions of the market.9
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The notion of free market at its face value signifies that market forces should 
have a predominant role in the operation of the market. However, this should 
not imply that free market does not need a policy direction. Nor should the 
notion totally rule out the intervention of government. Perfect competition is 
simply a theoretical assumption, and it is to be noted that market imperfec-
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tions and restrictive business practices are prevalent in market situations 
many of which are man-made. Government intervention in markets, mainly 
through competition policies is unavoidable because governments intervene 
in markets mainly through competition policies.
Competition policy refers to those governmental measures that directly affect 
the behavior of enterprises and the structure of industry.10 As indicated 
above, an appropriate competition policy includes both micro-economic poli­
cies and competition law. Some of the microeconomic policies induced by 
the government have an important impact on competition and hence on the 
economy of developing or transitional economies. These economies are 
characterized by high level of public ownership, government intervention, 
importance of agricultural and service sectors with comparatively small in­
dustrial sectors, concentration of production in one or small number of com­
modities, small formal private sector, a large informal sector and dependence 
on imports for manufactured goods.11
The first governmental measure that has a bearing on competition, especially 
in transitional economies, is privatization and it refers to the transfer of own­
ership and management responsibility from the state to the private sector.12 
The second pertains to liberalization of trade wherein an attempt is made to 
expose protected domestic industries and services to competition from 
abroad.13 The third measure is about relaxing foreign investment and owner­
ship requirements whereas the fourth measure refers to economic deregula­
tion.14 In due course of a shift towards market economy, regulations like 
price controls and institutions like marketing boards phase out in many coun­
tries where companies are allowed to have more freedom in their decisions 
over pricing and production.15
It must be emphasized that an effective competition policy is especially es­
sential for transition economies because their capital markets are often not as 
effective as those in developed countries. Moreover, they have significant 
import restraints, and government organs play a dominant role in setting 
prices and in making other vital decisions in addition to which they are 
highly affected by the culture of collusion rather than by competition. 16
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2. Objectives of Competition Policy
Competition policies of different countries have different objectives. This is 
so because there are different political systems with different economic goals 
and competition policies are mainly reflections of these political systems.17 
Proper understanding of the objectives of competition policy is thus impor­
tant to comprehend the nature of monopoly and the problems caused by it.
In a monopoly market form there is generally only one firm in the concerned 
industry and there are no close substitutes for the product of the monopolist.18 
Close substitutes are goods or services that are considered to be economically 
inter-changeable by buyers.19 Since there are no close substitutes of the prod­
uct available, competition is absent in this market form.20 What follows from 
the absence of competition in the monopoly market form is that the monopo­
list is a price maker and therefore can fix the price and allow demand to de­
termine output, or set output and allow demand to set the price.21 22 There are 
adverse effects that ensue from this market form. Some of these are the ten­
dency to reduce output, to increase price and to reduce the quality or the ser-
By its very nature, competition policy aims at fighting monopolies and thus 
preserving free competition. One of the major objectives of competition pol­
icy is the protection of the consumers' interest.23 There are three approaches 
in the protection of consumers’ interest:
a) The thrust of the first approach, which is associated with the Chicago 
school, is that it ignores consumers’ interest and focuses solely on social 
welfare and economic efficiency.24 This approach has little support 
among policy makers and the society at large because it ignores the pro­
tection of the consumers’ interest.25
b) The second approach recognizes the immediate and short term interests 
of consumers as the primary aim of competition policy. 26
c) According to the third approach the protection of interest of consumers 
is essentially a long term goal, and its immediate concerns are to be sub­
ordinated to the welfare of the society as a whole.27
7 Czeres, The Controversies of the Consumer 
Welfare Standard, Competition Law Re­
view, March 2007,(http://www.global com­
petition policy. Org)
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It is a point of consensus that no democratic government would viably afford 
to impose competition policy that solely focuses on efficiency or on social 
welfare. It has to consider the interest of consumers.28 But how does compe­
tition policy protect the interest of consumers?
Competitive market forces business enterprises to do their best to attract and 
retain their consumers. Towards this end, enterprises have to strive towards 
excellence in innovation, choice, quality service and price.29 Competition, in 
effect, offers a greater choice of products at lower prices because of the fear 
that only the fittest will survive in the market.30 Consumers are better off 
under such setting because purchasing power of consumers increases as a 
result of lower prices,.
For example, an Ethiopian farmer who used to buy battery cells for 5 Birr 
each saves Birr 3 if, due to competitive market, the price comes down to Birr 
2 each. The farmer can thus use the margin to buy something else. But we 
don't have to forget that business firms are consumers too. In their business 
activities they purchase the products of other firms as their inputs and the 
price and quality of these inputs partly determine their own competitiveness 
and profits.31
An equally important objective of the competition policy is that it stimulates 
efficiency and competitiveness across the economy.32 Economic efficiency 
would be taken as an encouragement of allocation and dynamic efficiency 
that could be materialized through lowered production costs and technologi­
cal change and innovation.33
Yet, the most common objective of competition policy is the maintenance of 
the competitive process or of free competition. As this objective is the step­
ping stone for the other objectives, it aims at striking down or preventing un­
reasonable restraints on competition.34 The Supreme Court of U.S.A in its 
decision in the case between Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States 
(1958) aptly summarized the objectives of competition policy. It stated:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic 
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as a rule of trade. 
It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces 
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the 
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time pro­
28 Supra, note 17, p.127
29 Supra, note 2, p.6
30 Cuts, Competition Policy and Law Made
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31
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38 MIZAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 2 No.1, Jan 2008
viding an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic politi­
cal and social institutions.35
3. Competition Law
Competition law is also referred to as antitrust or antimonopoly law or re­
strictive business legislation. The function of competition law is to prevent 
anti-competitive business practices by firms and to prevent unnecessary gov­
ernment intervention in the market place.36
3.1- Competition policy versus competition law
Although competition law is one component of competition policy, competi­
tion policy and competition law are not identical. Nor does one stand for the 
other. Competition policy could be taken as a positive instrument because it 
facilitates competition, while competition law could be regarded as a nega­
tive instrument because it prevents anti-competitive practices.
In fact, competition law is believed to complement other policies that pro­
mote competition by preventing restrictive business practices and by facilitat­
ing market access. In this regard, it could be said that the enforcement of 
competition law is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for maintaining 
fair competition. This is so because in addition to competition law there are 
competition enhancing policies which ought to be in place.
Such policies, inter alia, include liberalized trade policy, relaxed foreign in­
vestment and ownership requirements, economic deregulation and privatiza­
tion. Thus, microeconomic policies that enhance competition and competi­
tion law are two sides of the same coin. Furthermore, it could be said that 
competition policy is an economic concept whereas competition law is a le­
gal concept. 37
Competition law mainly targets so-called "restrictive business prac­
tices" (RBPs). These practices which constitute the main content of competi­
tion law are abuse of dominance, anti-competitive arrangements, otherwise 
called collusion, and mergers and acquisitions.38 Apart from these practices, 
some countries provide provisions for unfair competition 39 in their competi­
tion laws. For example, the 2003 Ethiopian Trade Practices Proclamation 
and the 2003 Tanzanian Fair Competition Act address the issue of unfair 
competition.40 Even before the 2003 Trade Practices Proclamation came in to
35
36
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force in Ethiopia, the concept of unfair competition was embodied under Ar­
ticles 130-134 of the 1960 Commercial Code and under Article 2057 of the 
1960 Civil Code.
3.2- Abuse of dominance
Distinction has to be made between a legitimate dominant market position 
and abuse of dominant market position. What the law prohibits is abusive 
behavior but not dominant position as such. As it has been rightly main­
tained, firms could achieve a legitimate dominant market position, for exam­
ple, through innovation, superior production or distribution methods or 
through greater entrepreneurial efforts. 41
The fact that abusive behavior requires the existence of dominant market po­
sition is a matter of common knowledge because a market power that does 
not exist cannot be abused. Equally true is that a specific dominant market 
position that does not result in abusive behavior is outside the scope of com­
petition law.
The analysis of dominant market position will be meaningful only when it is 
done with regard to a relevant market. The relevant market for the assess­
ment of a dominant position is the market that comprises all products or ser­
vices that actually or potentially compete with each other.42 To define a rele­
vant market is to describe the context for the exercise of market power:- the 
ability of an enterprise to profitably raise price above competitive levels for a 
significant period of time.43
3.3- Components of market
A market has two components: the product market and the geographic mar­
ket4  The product market describes the goods or services that are bought and 
sold whereas the geographic market refers to the location of the production or 
the sale of the product. The whole aim is to determine the extent to which 
purchasers would switch between alternate products or source of supply45 in 
response to a small but significant and non-transitory price increase. In 
other words, the product market is all about those products or services which 
consumers would switch to if price of the relevant product or service rose, 
when that switching prevents prices from rising above the competitive 
level.46
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The geographic market is defined by the buyers’ view of the substitutability 
of products made or sold at various locations.47 It is believed that if buyers of 
a product sold at one location were to switch to buying the product from a 
source at another location in response to a small but significant and non­
transitory price increase, then those two locations are in the same geographic 
market.48
Once a relevant market has been defined, it is necessary to establish the exis­
tence of a dominant position of a firm, the essence of which is the power to 
behave independently of competitive pressures. Dominance of market power 
helps the firm in question to charge higher prices and to engage in some anti­
competitive practices which could exclude or deter competition from the 
market.49 It is to be noted that the market share of a firm and the existence 
and the extent of market entry barriers 50 stand out as crucial among the fac­
tors which could show the dominant position of a firm.
3.4- Market share and market entry barriers
Production capacity, production volume and sales by value are commonly 
taken as the most important factors 51 among indicators of market share of a 
business firm. Under competition laws of some countries, a particular market 
share (often 40-50%), creates a rebuttable presumption of dominant posi­
tion.52 However, it is impossible to set out definite thresholds at which a firm 
can be judged as having or not having a significant market power.53 At any 
rate, the greater the market share of a firm, the more likely is that firm to ex­
ercise dominant market power54.
As indicated above, the existence and the magnitude of market entry barriers 
are important factors which show whether a firm has a dominant market posi­
tion. If entry to market is easy and sufficiently profitable, the firm’s domi­
nant position will inevitably erode over time.
There are different categories of entry barriers with different effects. There 
are absolute barriers to entry and there are those which are not absolute. For 
example, if a business firm has to be licensed before it enters into a certain 
business activity, the government license serves as an absolute barrier be­
cause the firm in question cannot enter into the business without having that 
license.
47 Supra, note 4, P 13 51 Supra, note 8, P 5-148
48 Ibid 52 Ibid
49 Supra, note 46, Article 3(9) 53 Ibid, 70-71
50 Supra, note 4, P 71 54 Ibid
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Generally, it can be said that the question of entry is the question of time, 
money and profit opportunity. There are factors which strengthen the domi­
nant market position of the already existing business firm/s by repelling the 
new entrants. This is so, where, among other things, entry into a certain busi­
ness takes a long time and if it requires spending a lot of money, and above 
all where there is a less or minimal profit opportunity.
3.5- Abusive practices
The following behaviors are commonly considered as abusive and prohibited 
by competition laws of many countries.
a) Excessive price on a product or a service
Excessive prices that restrain competition must be stopped.55 But this does 
not mean that a price of a commodity or a service in a free market economy 
has to be regulated by the state. Moreover, it does not imply that every price 
increase is unacceptable because price may increase for different reasons, 
including surges in demand, high unit costs and exercise of market power.
b) Price discrimination
Where a seller charges different prices according to the profile of the cus­
tomer but in the absence of appreciable cost differences that might justify 
different prices,56 there is said to be price discrimination.
c) RefUsal to deal
Competition law does not generally oblige firms to cooperate with competi­
tors against their will. But the law prohibits refusal to deal in situations 
where dealing with the competitors does not force the firm in question to in­
cur unnecessary expenses or damages and when the dealing is crucial for the 
business operation of the other competitors.
d) Tie-in
The fourth abusive practice is what is commonly called the tie-in which con­
sists in making the sale of one product conditional upon the purchases of 
another product. This behavior is seen as abusive only if the firm has a 
dominant market position, and even when it does, the decision on whether or 
not the tie-in is abusive requires the analysis of the purpose of the tie-in and 
the market context.57
55
56
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e) Predatory pricing
Under what is called predatory pricing, the firm sells its products at prices so 
low as to drive competitors out of market to prevent new entry and to suc­
cessfully monopolize the market. At its face value, predation or selling goods 
or services at unreasonably low prices has nothing wrong in it or may even 
appear advantageous to the consumers. But predation is condemned not be­
cause it results in low prices but because it is likely to lead to reduced output 
and high prices in the future.58
f) Vertical restraints
The sixth commonly prohibited abusive business practices are vertical re­
straints. Vertical restraints are restrictions that are imposed by the upstream 
firm (a manufacturer or a wholesaler) on a downstream firm (a retailer). In 
these restraints, the downstream retailer agrees to limit where it sells the 
product, or not to sell rival products and, at times, the retailer agrees not to 
sell below prices established by the manufacturer.59
3.6- Regulation of restrictive business agreements
Competition laws of many countries regulate restrictive business agreements 
as their second component. These agreements are of two types. There are 
horizontal agreements, that is, agreements between competitors and there are 
vertical agreements, i.e., agreements between upstream and downstream 
firms.
Not all horizontal agreements hurt competition. Some horizontal agree­
ments are important for the market because they foster efficiency, reduce 
risk, create new or improved products or methods of distribution or they may 
create a better information flow thereby helping the market to be competi­
tive.60 For example, an agreement between competitors to construct a new 
plant that none could build independently, to conduct research and develop­
ment that none could afford independently, to jointly purchase supplies and 
thereby to reduce their costs, to form a network of suppliers to offer a new 
product or reduced costs are competitively beneficial to the firms as well as 
to the market itself.61
In contrast, there are horizontal agreements which do impede competition, by 
restricting output and raising prices. Specifically, there are horizontal agree­
ments that eliminate competition, e.g., price fixing, bid rigging, and alloca­
58 Ibid, 77 -78 60 Ibid, 9
59 Ibid, 78 - 79 61 Ibid
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tion of markets.62 The following are some of the vertical agreements consid­
ered as restrictive and hence prohibited.63
• Resale price maintenance: It is an agreement where price floors or ceiling 
are imposed by the manufacturer.
• Exclusive distribution agreement: It is an agreement whereby distributors 
are assigned exclusively within a geographic area or over particular types 
of clients or over specific products.
• Exclusive dealing agreement: It is an agreement whereby downstream 
firms are prohibited from dealing with competing producers or distribu­
tors.
• Tie-in sale agreement:- It is an agreement whereby downstream firms are 
required to purchase a certain range of products before being allowed to 
purchase a particular product. An extreme example is what is called “Full 
line forcing”, whereby a downstream firm is required to purchase an entire 
product range.
• Quantity forcing: It is an agreement whereby downstream firms are re­
quired to purchase a minimum quantity of a product.
3.7- Mergers and acquisitions
The concern of competition law includes mergers and acquisition. The pri­
mary concerns on mergers and acquisition emanate from the fact that both 
can result in the concentration of market power. Sometimes, market struc­
tures become more concentrated over time resulting in the success of few 
firms and in the failure of the rest not because of the competitive efforts by 
the former but because of mergers or acquisitions. Thus, if it is the concen­
tration of market power that is suspicious, then the rationale for controlling 
mergers and acquisitions is simple: it is far better to prevent firms from gain­
ing market power than to control the already created power.64
There are three categories of mergers: horizontal, vertical and conglomer- 
ate.65 Horizontal mergers take place between two firms that are actual or 
potential competitors, which sell the same products or close substitutes. The 
term “horizontal” signifies the fact that the two enterprises are at an identical 
level in the chain of production. Vertical mergers take place between firms 
at different levels in the chain of production. Such firms have an actual or 
potential buyer-seller relationship. Conglomerate mergers are neither hori­
zontal nor vertical; they neither produce competing products nor are in an 
actual or potential buyer-seller relationship.66 62 63 64
62 Ibid, 19 - 20 65 Ibid, 42
63 Ibid , 36 - 3 7 66 Ibid
64 Ibid, 41
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Not all mergers pose a threat to competition in a given market, as some of 
them are the result of investments by firms with available cash or result from 
the better use of underutilized enterprise resources; and the impact of other 
mergers on competition and on consumers is indeed negligible. From those 
categories of mergers indicated above, horizontal mergers are the most sus­
pect because they tend to reduce the number of independent competitors in a 
particular market.67
If it is more desirable to prevent firms from gaining concentrated market 
power than attempting to control the same power after its creation, the most 
effective method is a notification obligation, that is, requiring notification by 
firms of their intent to merge in advance of consummation. The requirement 
of such notification is to permit the competition authority to investigate the 
transaction and, if necessary, to prevent or amend the merger transaction be­
fore it becomes effective.68
One important point that has to be underlined is that not all mergers need be 
notified in advance. The requirement to notify all merger cases would create 
an unnecessary compliance burden on the business community and an exces­
sive workload for the competition authority which has to review every notifi­
cation. The desirable method to follow is to set a minimum threshold below 
which mergers should not be reported. The size threshold may be expressed 
in terms of annual sales (turnover), total assets or both. Additionally, the size 
of the transaction (the value of the securities or assets to be acquired or 
merged) and the size of the parties (the minimum size of either party) should 
be included into the threshold.69
3.8- Unfair competition
In a few countries, the competition law includes rules on unfair competition. 
By unfair competition, the following is understood:
“ Dishonest or fraudulent rivalry in trade and commerce, especially, the prac­
tice of endeavoring to pass off one’s own goods or products in the market for 
those of another by means of imitating or counterfeiting the name, brand, size, 
shape, or other distinctive characteristics of the article or its packaging.” 70
Thus, by its very nature, this practice infringes the intellectual property rights 
of individuals or individual firms. Yet, its overall impact on competition, a 
country’s economy, or the market in general is said to be minimal. Thus, if 
the competition authority preoccupies itself with enforcing this field of the 
competition law, it will spend its time and resources in arbitrating basically 67 68
67 Ibid 69 Ibid
68 Ibid, 56 70 Supra, note 5
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private disputes.71 According to the proponents of this view, the unfair com­
petition cases must be arbitrated by regular courts.
The prohibited behaviors under the notion of unfair competition are:- (1) 
The distribution of false or misleading information that is capable of harming 
the business interests of other firms, (2) The distribution of false or mislead­
ing information to consumers, including the distribution of information lack­
ing a reasonable basis, related to the price, character, method or place of pro­
duction, properties, suitability for use, or quality of goods, (3) False or mis­
leading comparison of goods in the process of advertising, (4) Fraudulent 
use of another’s trademark, firm name, or product labeling or packaging, (5) 
Unauthorized receipt, use of dissemination, of confidential, scientific, techni­
cal, production, business, or trade information. 72
4. Competition Authority and Competition Culture
The success of competition policy depends not only on a well drafted piece 
of legislation, but requires effective enforcement of these provisions. This in 
its turn necessitates putting in place a proper competition authority and build­
ing-up a competition culture. As regards the competition authority, three 
things are crucial, namely, independence, powers and resources.
4.1- Competition Authority
Competition authorities may take one of a number of different structures. 
The most independent competition authorities are not only administratively 
separated from the government but they are staffed by competition profes­
sionals and they do not rely on the government for their budgetary alloca­
tions. On the other hand, the least independent authorities are those which 
form part of government ministry and therefore are subject to civil service 
restrictions on recruitment and on central budget allocations in their admin­
istrative activities.73
The powers of competition authorities may be divided into investigative and 
adjudicatory. As regards these powers, practices differ from country to coun­
try. In countries like Canada, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia, the inves­
tigative power is exercised by one body while the adjudicatory power is exer­
cised by another.74 On the other hand, the competition authorities of some 
countries (for example Pakistan) exercise both the investigative and the adju­
Supra, note 4 P. 147
72 Ibid
73 Supra, note 11, P 40
74 UNCTAD Guide book on competition sys­
tems (United Nations, New York and Ge­
neva, 2007) pp. 35,135,150,and 159 respec­
tively
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dicatory powers.75 In countries like India, Tanzania and Zambia, the competi­
tion authorities have adjudicatory role in the sense that their decisions have a 
binding force whereas in Kenya this decision-making power is vested with 
the concerned ministry76. The powers granted to competition authorities 
should include the power of advocacy which is important to create competi­
tion culture necessary as a helping hand in the implementation of competition 
law.
Any government which wants to implement competition law in a meaningful 
way, has to provide the necessary support for the competition authority. In 
this regard the level of financial support available and the way it is used is 
important; but equally important is the man-power. In developing countries, 
in particular, the shortage of man-power is understandable because there is 
only a small pool of persons with knowledge of competition related laws or 
economics or with regulatory experience. But the same cannot be said as 
regards the shortage of other resources because this problem could be solved 
over-time as the awareness level of the concerned authorities and/or officials 
improves.
4.1- Competition Culture
Governments committed to implement competition policy and/or competition 
law or its competition authority should do their utmost to build up a competi­
tion culture, because fair competition cannot develop in its absence. Needless 
-to-say, competition culture promotes a well regulated market, efficient allo­
cation of resource and production processes in the economy, and stimulates 
firms to compete with one another in price, in quality and through the inno­
vation of new products. The benefits of this efficiency do not just accrue to 
firms, but lead to greater value and choice for customers, environmental pro­
tection and sustainable development.
Competition culture is made up of a number of elements of which laws form 
only one part.77 There are many stakeholders that can contribute to the flour­
ishing of competition culture. Active consumers, responsible business, sensi­
tized media and those other institutions which work in cooperation with the 
competition authority could be mentioned as examples.78
It is to be noted that competition culture is a result of comprehensive, con­
tinuous and strenuous advocacy work. Advocacy work targets beyond unfair 
business practices in the private business sector; and it further aims at solving 
problems caused by unnecessary public intervention in an economy and
75 Supra, note 11, P 41 77 Ibid, 23
76 Ibid 78 Ibid, 23 - 24
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problems caused by the implementation of state measures which advance pri­
vate interest .
Moreover, competition advocacy demands the performance of different ac­
tivities. These activities include performing reviews of existing and proposed 
laws and regulations, providing advice on state measures that might foster 
anti competitive practices and associated resource misallocation, conducting 
outreach activities to educate the public directly through the holding of semi­
nars and the publication of news letters, or indirectly through the media, in­
forming judges and legislators about competition policy related matters, and 
undertaking studies of actual or potential state measures that may influence 
market out comes .79 80
Part II- The Case of Ethiopia
Starting from the transitional period, the Ethiopian Government has pledged 
to enforce free market economic policy and it has reiterated its position in the 
Trade Practices Proclamation of 2003. The Trade Practices Proclamation 
(hereinafter the Proclamation) regulates certain areas of competition and has 
established the Trade Practices Investigation Commission (hereinafter Com­
mission) which became operational starting from September 2004.
But the Ethiopian competition regime is facing a number of problems which 
need timely attention. These problems could be divided into those emanating 
from the Proclamation itself and those which do not have any relationship 
with the Proclamation.
The Proclamation does not offer a complete set of competition rules. Article 
6(1) of the Proclamation should be mentioned in this regard in that it omits 
any reference to forms of collusion other than "written" or "oral" agreements. 
In order to prevent undertakings from evading the application of Article 6(1) 
by colluding in a way that falls short of an agreement, other categories of col­
lusive behaviour should be included, that is, the concept of ‘concerted prac­
tice’ and ‘decision’ by an association of firms or undertakings.81 Moreover, 
Article 6(2) of the Proclamation lacks precision and a clear reference to verti­
cal restraint although it prohibits certain collusive behaviors.
79 Simon J. Evenett, “Competition advocacy: 
Time for a rethink?” Northwestern Journal 
of International Law and Business, 26: 495 
(2006) 497 - 98
80 Competition advocacy in regulated sectors: 
Examples of success, Report of the capacity
Building and competition policy Implemen­
tation working Group, International compe­
tition Net work, Seoul, Korea at 47 - 48, 
cited in a work under note 79.
81 International Development Law Organiza­
tion (IDLO) Report on Reviewing the Insti­
tutional and Legal Framework for the Devel­
opment of a Better Competition Law Re­
gime in Ethiopia (2007), 9
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The provisions of the Proclamation on abuse of dominance have attracted the 
attention of many observers and experts. The main problem pointed out by 
these observers and experts is the absence of a definition of relevant market 
and dominance in the Proclamation. It may be argued that the title of Article 
11 of the Proclamation is an indication for the prohibition of abusing domi­
nant market power. The absence of definition of dominance in the Proclama­
tion has led some observers to interpret Article 11(1) as not prohibiting the 
abuse of dominant market power at all.82
It is true that the content of Article 11 is misleading mainly because the pro­
vision does not define relevant market and market power. But in light of its 
title, the purpose of this article is the prohibition of abusing dominant market 
power. The argument which does not see any relationship between those pro­
hibited practices under the provision and relevant market and market power 
is simply foreign to the concepts and notions on abuse of market power. Fur­
thermore, Articles 11(2) (a) and 11(2) (i) are indeed confusing because they 
share elements of predatory pricing. Furthermore, there seems to be a slip of 
the pen regarding Article 11(2) (f) of the Proclamation because the proper 
place for the practices it prohibits is unfair competition but not abuse of 
dominance.
Whether or not the competition law of different countries provides for merg­
ers and acquisitions has become one major international yardstick to measure 
the adequacy of those laws. The Trade Practices Proclamation of 2003 does 
not include provisions on mergers and acquisitions. And, the absence of pro­
cedural rules in the Proclamation complicates the problem further.
The Proclamation bundles competition and non-competition provisions. Ex­
amples of non-competition provisions are Article 10(2) (h) on anti-dumping 
and Articles 20 and 21 which are on labeling and price regulation respec­
tively. One obvious problem of this bundling is that it diverts the attention of 
the competition authority from real competition issues. The other problem is 
that the non-competition cases could remain unresolved. Moreover, there are 
problems in the Ethiopian competition regime pertaining to the organiza­
tional setup of the Commission, man power, budget and other resources.
The Commission has investigative and adjudicatory powers. The fact that the 
Commission is entrusted with powers to decide on cases it has investigated, 
obviously raises the problem of partiality. However, one may contend that 
there is no issue of bias as long as the parties of the decision can file an ap­
peal with a court. Most competition authorities, at national or at international 
level (such as the European Commission, US Federal Trade Commission,
82 Ibid, 10
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German competition authorities) decide upon the case they have investigated 
themselves.
In spite of the Commission’s power of investigation, only hearings have been 
conducted so far. I don't remember any case decided by the Commission 
which was supported by an investigation which involves fieldwork. One ob­
vious explanation for this problem is lack of necessary manpower. If the in­
vestigative problems of the Commission remain unaddressed, the competi­
tion or the market problems of the country will remain unaddressed and the 
competition authority will remain preoccupied with unfair competition cases.
Article 55(4) of the FDRE Constitution entrusts the House of Peoples' Repre­
sentatives with the power to enact a Commercial Code and what the Procla­
mation regulates clearly falls within the scope of commerce. In light of this, 
the Proclamation applies nationwide. But the Commission does not have 
branch offices in the regional states or at least in some of them.
As a matter of fact the Commission is composed of high ranking government 
officials. So far, I don't remember any strong case in which the impartiality 
of the Commission was questioned. But in light of its composition, the fear 
of partiality cannot be totally ruled out.
The members of the Commission serve on a part-time basis because they 
have to perform regular duties elsewhere. The Proclamation provides for the 
establishment of a permanent commission but what we have in practice is a 
board-like collection of individuals. Until very recently, there were five 
Commission members and there is only one lawyer.
One of the reasons that explain best the establishment of competition authori­
ties is the desire of having speedy decision on competition cases. While the 
decisions of the Commission have never been that speedy, they are of a good 
quality. The report submitted to the World Bank by the International Devel­
opment Law Organization (IDLO) 83 in March, 2007 alleges that the Com­
mission has received no competition complaints up to now, and that it has not 
conducted a single competition investigation since its creation.
However, the source of this information is hearsay and the assertion that the 
Commission has not conducted a single competition enquiry until now is 
simply false. It is to be noted that competition enquiry in the course of adju­
dication is different from investigation (which includes field work). It is true 
that many of the cases decided by the Commission during the period in ques­
tion were related to unfair competition cases. But there were competition 
cases as well.
83 Ibid, 8
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The Commission is accountable to the Minister of Trade and Industry as far 
as its decisions are concerned. This is so because Sub-articles (2) and (3) of 
Article 15 of the Proclamation provide that any administrative measures or 
penalty must be approved by the Minister. The accountability of the Com­
mission to the Minister regarding planning and reporting is somewhat accept­
able; but to make the Commission accountable to the Minister in matters per­
taining to its decisions utterly erodes the Commission's independence.
Situations could arise where the Ministry of Trade and Industry appears be­
fore the Commission as a party. To give the final say of approval to the Min­
ister on a case in which the Ministry is involved as a party, totally under­
mines the impartiality of the system and defeats the whole notion of justice. 
For example, in a case involving the export of teff, Ministry of Trade and In­
dustry was a plaintiff.
The Commission does not have its own secretariat because Article 2(9) of the 
Proclamation designates a department under the organizational structure of 
the Ministry to fulfil this task. The problem as regards this arrangement is 
that the members of this department are not accountable to the Commission 
and they are not in a position to give proper service to the Commission. This 
is partly due to shortage of resources and lack of experience.
The Commission has two lawyers and one economist on a full-time basis and 
one more lawyer as a part-timer. But none of them had previous training in 
competition economics or competition law. The Commission does not have 
its own budget either. Though there has been some progress regarding the 
provision of resources, much remains to be done in this area as well.
Conclusion
Development is incomplete without implementing competition policy and/or 
competition law; and endeavors to build a democratic system are incomplete 
without market reform. Therefore when we talk about competition policy 
and/or competition law, we are in other words talking about development, 
and serious development endeavors presuppose the implementation of com­
petition policy and/or competition law.
Competition (either negatively or positively) affects business, consumers, as 
well as the whole nation. And more importantly, all of us are consumers in 
one way or the other. Thus, we ought to join hands and work towards the 
proper implementation of competition policy and/or competition law.
The Ethiopian competition regime is in a very bad state and it must be res­
cued very soon. The only way to do it is to put in place an adequate competi­
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tion law and a truly independent and strong competition commission and a 
competition tribunal.
It was as far back as 1889 and 1890 that Canada and USA, respectively, laid 
strong foundations for a proper competition regime. If Ethiopia cannot do so 
after over a century, we need to indeed take the blame. Until Ethiopia’s com­
petition regime is comprehensively addressed, the business community, con­
sumers of goods and services, and the transitional economy at large are 
bound to steadily encounter the pitfalls of inadequate competition laws and 
insufficient regulatory mechanisms. ----------------- ■
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